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ABSTRACT
Law student practice is a powerful pedagogical tool that must be wielded
judiciously. At its best, student practice coalesces a student’s professional
values and prepares that student to become a competent, compassionate,
and confident lawyer. However, the current regime of state student practice
rules, rooted in the American Bar Association’s (ABA) model rule, undermines
the integrity of student practice in several crucial ways. In most states,
students are authorized to practice law without meaningful oversight by
law schools, and supervisors need not complete any special training. Supervisors
are not universally required to accompany students to court, even when
students are acting as prosecutors. Some student practice rules still fail
to account for the wide range of work that is done by students in many law
school clinics, particularly in transactional clinics. Financial incentives
skew the focus away from student learning in states that allow students to
not only represent wealthy individuals but also charge for their services,
all outside the oversight of law school programs. This Article examines
these problems with existing state student practice rules and proposes rule
reform in light of the goals and purpose of student practice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine going to your doctor’s office with a serious medical concern.
You tender a copay and wait to be seen. When your name is called and
you go back to the examination room, instead of a physician you are greeted
by a student-doctor. The student-doctor tells you she has a permit allowing
her to practice medicine. You make conversation by asking about the
process to obtain that type of permit. She says she completed a form and
sent it to the medical board along with her transcript. You ask if she is
getting credit for this internship and she says no, this is not a school
program; she is being paid. She has not mentioned a supervisor, so you
ask what type of supervision she gets. The student-doctor says there is no
requirement that her supervisor observes nor checks her work, nor provides
any particular training or oversight of any kind. The supervising doctor
is generally responsible for the student’s work, but the manner of supervision
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is up to the discretion of the individual supervisor. The student-doctor
says she thought she would get more supervision, but the supervising doctor
is very busy so they do not get to talk as much as she would like. Growing
concerned, you ask what type of practical training she has had so far in
medical school. The student-doctor tells you she has completed a number
of lecture courses but no practical training yet—that is what she is hoping
to get in this internship.
The above vignette is, of course, fantasy in a medical context—but not
in the practice of law. Student practice is a powerful tool in experiential
learning, central to law school clinics and many externship programs. 1
However, in many states, law students can be certified to engage in the
practice of law outside law school clinics or even externship programs,
without accountability to any law school.2 The level of supervision required
varies by state, but does not generally include any specific practices,
training, or self-reflection on the part of the supervisor.3 In many instances,
the supervisor need not be present with a student in court.4 Often, students
can be paid and clients charged for this work.5 Unaffiliated student practice
occurs not only in non-for-profit contexts, but also in government and the
private sector.6 One particularly troubling setting in which unaffiliated
student practice can occur is a prosecutor’s office.7 Given the heightened
ethical responsibility of the prosecutor and the devastating consequences
of prosecutorial conduct in the machinery of mass incarceration, law

1. Sixty-nine percent of clinics and externships report that their students practice
under a student practice rule. ROBERT R. KUEHN, MARGARET REUTER & DAVID A. SANTACROCE,
2019-20 SURVEY OF APPLIED LEGAL EDUCATION 27 (2020).
2. See infra Part II.A. This Article will refer to this practice as unaffiliated student
practice.
3. See infra Part II.A.
4. See infra note 7.
5. See infra Part II.B.
6. See infra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., COLO. R. CIV. P. 205.7(2)(a)(i) (allowing students to appear in “any
county or municipal court criminal proceedings, except when the defendant has been charged
with a felony”); KAN. SUP. CT. R. 719(i)(3) (“With the supervising attorney’s written
consent and the court’s approval, a legal intern may appear on behalf of the government
in a criminal matter without the personal presence of the supervising attorney.”); MASS.
S.J.C. RULE 3:03(1)–(2) (2020) (allowing prosecutor’s to “general[ly] supervis[e]” students
without being present in court).
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student practitioners are poorly equipped to play the role of prosecutor in
the absence of rigorous supervision.8
Loosely regulated law student practice threatens not only the public, but
the students who engage in it. A client or opponent’s rights may be harmed
by an unsupervised student. Unsupervised or incompetently supervised
students may learn bad habits, including a disregard for procedural justice,
and be exposed to unnecessary ethical or malpractice liability. Quality
supervision is a valuable commodity that is not likely to materialize without
certain regulations in place.9 Because supervising student practitioners is
incredibly time-intensive, lawyers who accept unaffiliated student practitioners
either have an unusual abundance of time or are not actually engaging in
proper supervision. Certainly there are practitioners who have a passion
for mentorship and a willingness to dedicate appropriate time to adequately
supervise students. However, the current student practice rules in many
states have no way of distinguishing between those special lawyers and
cavalier ones who may even see student practitioners as a low-cost labor
source.
This Article will address various shortcomings in the current student
practice rule regime. Particularly when combined, these shortcomings
significantly deregulate student practice in problematic ways. Some issues
are found in the American Bar Association (ABA) model rule for student
practice,10 which was passed in 1969 and amended in 1979;11 other issues
have arisen where states have abandoned the few model rule provisions
that did impose concrete parameters on student supervision. Regardless
of the origin of these problems, states need not accept flawed student
practice rules. Professors Wallace Mlyniec and Haley Etchison have argued
that student practice rules should be updated when the rules no longer
function.12 This Article will provide an overview of the national landscape
8. Prosecutors are subject to heighted ethical rules, MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r.
3.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983), as well as disclosure obligations such as those required by
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Prosecutors also have vast discretion within the
justice system, which can be highly destructive when not exercised with exquisite caution.
See generally ANGELA J. D AVIS, ARBITRARY J USTICE : THE P OWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR (2007).
9. See Karen A. Jordan, Enhancing Externships to Meet Expectations for Experiential
Education, 23 CLINICAL L. REV. 339, 349 (2016) (arguing that it is unrealistic to expect
supervisors who are not compensated as supervisors to “carve out time from day-to-day
demands for effective teaching and feedback during supervision in the field”).
10. See infra Part III.
11. Annual Report of the American Bar Association, 94 AM. BAR ASS’N. 290–92
(1969) [hereinafter 1969 A.B.A. Report]; Annual Report of the American Bar Association,
104 AM. BAR. ASS’N 730 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 A.B.A. Report].
12. See Wallace J. Mlyniec & Haley D. Etchison, Conceptualizing Student Practice
for the 21st Century: Educational and Ethical Considerations in Modernizing the District
of Columbia Student Practice Rules, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 207, 258 (2015).
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of student practice rules, explore the theoretical underpinnings of student
practice, discuss the need for specific reforms, and urge the profession,
the academy, and experiential educators in particular to advocate for rules
that better fit current practice models and the goals of student practice.
Part II will delineate the most problematic common pitfalls found in
current student practice rules: abdication of supervisor responsibility,
susceptibility to financial pressures, erosion of client autonomy, and the
underinclusive focus on in-court practice. Part III will briefly trace the
history of the model student practice rule, including how the model rule
spurred the passage of student practice rules in all states. Part IV will
define the theoretical goals of student practice, which will serve as a
foundation for updating the rules to better serve these goals. Part V will
argue the importance of rule reform for all those involved in the legal
profession and outline several guiding concepts or touchstones to help
shape reform efforts and ensure that student practice is serving students
and the public, and advancing the interests of justice.
II. SHORTCOMINGS OF EXISTING STUDENT PRACTICE RULES
Today, many states’ student practice rules still carry vestiges of the ABA
model rule, first adopted in 1969.13 Although some states have completely
overhauled their student practice rules,14 a number of states continue to
follow many, if not all, of the model rule’s provisions.15 Where states
have deviated from the model rule, those deviations have not always been
productive to the interests of students and the public.16 This Part will

13. Margaret Martin Barry, Jon C. Dubin & Peter A. Joy, Clinical Education for
This Millennium: The Third Wave, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 20 (2000).
14. See, e.g., Mlyniec & Etchison, supra note 12, at 219–58 (explaining the process of
modernizing D.C.’s student practice rule); D.C. CT. APP. R. 48 (reflecting the many
changes discussed in Mlyniec and Etchison’s article).
15. See 1969 A.B.A. Report, supra note 11, at 291 (stating that the presence of a
supervisor is not required); infra note 25 (listing states that follow the model rule in not
requiring a supervisor present); 1969 A.B.A. Report, supra note 11, at 290–92 (allowing
unaffiliated student practice); infra note 32 (listing states that follow the model rule in
allowing unaffiliated student practice); 1979 A.B.A. Report, supra note 11 (the indigency
requirement from the model rule); infra note 61 (listing states that have no indigency
requirement); 1969 A.B.A. Report, supra note 11, at 291 (allowing indirect compensation);
infra note 74 (listing states that allow indirect compensation); 1969 A.B.A. Report, supra note 11,
at 290–92 (focusing on in-court practice); infra note 99 (listing some states whose rules
focus only on in-court practice).
16. See infra Part III.C.
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discuss deficits in the national landscape of student practice rules, focusing
on the ways in which rules detract from student learning and client
interests. It is important to keep in mind how the issues outlined below
interact with one another. Addressing one of these issues may significantly
mitigate the risks presented by other issues. However, when states fail to
impose regulations in multiple areas, the result can be almost entirely
deregulated student practice.
A. Abdication of Supervision Responsibility
Although high-quality supervision is an essential component of successful
student practice, the current patchwork of student practice rules does not
ensure adequate student supervision in all states. Following the model
rule, many states permit student practice of law to occur entirely outside
of in-house clinics or even externship programs.17 In those states, students
can obtain permits and practice law in the community, supervised by
lawyers with no additional training, oversight, or pedagogical accountability.18
Some students are allowed to be paid for these placements and some are
not.19 Although ABA reports from the time the model rule was passed
and updated indicate that the model rule intended for student practice to
be managed by law school faculties, the rule does not make that assumption
explicit.20 As a result, states that adopted the model rule had wide latitude
to permit student practice outside of law school oversight.
The model rule required a law school dean to certify that the student has
“good character and competent legal ability” and has been “adequately
trained to perform as a legal intern;”21 there was no requirement that the
law school approve of the student’s practice placement or supervisor.22
This is unlike the student practice model in other professions, such as
medicine, in which student practice is deeply integrated into the medical
17. In its purpose section, the model rule stated that it was adopted “[a]s one means
of providing assistance to lawyers who represent clients unable to pay for such services
and to encourage law schools to provide clinical instruction in trial work of varying
kinds . . . .” 1969 A.B.A. Report, supra note 11, at 290. The notion of students doing work
outside of law school clinics for paying clients seems well outside the scope envisioned
by the model rule.
18. Id.
19. See infra Part II.B.
20. 1969 A.B.A. Report, supra note 11, at 290–91; 1979 A.B.A. Report, supra note
11.
21. 1969 A.B.A. Report, supra note 11, at 290.
22. One potential part of the solution to the issue discussed in this subsection would
be for law deans to more critically view their responsibility to certify interns as prepare to
practice. However, law students are not considered to be fully prepared to practice until
they have graduated and passed the bar. The critical component of student practice is
supervision, which is not the responsibility of the law dean, but the placement supervisor.
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school curriculum and supervised by medical schools.23 The model rule
for law student practice also contained no parameters to ensure a minimum
standard of supervision. A supervisor’s presence was not required when
a student appeared in court; the supervisor needed to only “introduce” the
student.24 Remarkably, many states today allow students to represent clients
in court without a supervisor present.25
Anyone who has supervised enough students in court is well aware that
proceedings can quickly go awry and even well-prepared students may
require supervisor intervention to ensure that a client’s interests are
protected. Such moments may be rare, but they are not the only reason a
supervisor’s presence is essential. A supervisor who is not present in court
cannot give a student specific feedback on their performance. Such feedback,
as well as facilitation of student self-reflection,26 is an essential part of
experiential learning.27 A student who is not supervised in court will miss

23. See, e.g., Lucien Cardinal & Alan Kaell, The Role of Medical Education in the
Development of the Scientific Practice of Medicine, 7 J. CMTY. HOSP. INTERNAL MED.
PERSPS. 58, 59–60 (2017).
24. 1969 A.B.A. Report, supra note 11, at 291.
25. See, e.g., ALA. R. LEGAL INTERNSHIP L. STUDENTS R. II(C) (requiring supervisor
presence only for jury trials); ALASKA BAR R. 44 § 5(b)(1)–(3) (stating that presence can
be waived for certain case and hearing types); ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 39(c)(4)(C)(ii) (requiring
presence only in certain case types); MASS. S.J.C. R. 3:03 (stating presence not required);
CAL. R. CT. 9.42(d)(4) (stating presence not required for low level prosecutions with
supervisor approval); COLO. R. CIV. P. 205.7(2)(a)(i) (requiring presence only for testimonial
proceedings when representing a criminal defendant); DEL. SUP. CT. R. 56(b)(2) (stating
presence can be waived by the court in certain cases); HAW. SUP. CT. R. 7.2(a)(2) (court
can waive presence); IOWA CT. R. 31.15(2) (requiring presence only for appellate cases
and second-year students); MINN. SUPERVISED PRAC. R. 5(A)(4) (stating court can waive
presence); MO. SUP. CT. R. 13.01(a) (stating that client can waive presence when not
entitled to counsel); NEB. SUP. CT. R. § 3-702(A)(1) (stating court can waive presence); 27
N.C. ADMIN. CODE 01C.0206 (prerequiring presence at the court’s discretion); OHIO GOV.
BAR R. II § 5 (stating client and supervisor can waive presence in some case types); VT.
R. ADMISSION BAR R. 24(c) (stating client and court can waive presence); WIS. SUP. CT.
R. 50.06(2)(b) (stating client and court can waive presence in some cases); R. GOV. WYO.
STATE BAR & AUTH. PRAC. L. 9(c)(4) (stating client and court can waive presence in some
cases).
26. For a discussion on the importance of critical reflection as a goal of experiential
learning, see infra Part IV.B.3.
27. Feedback and assessment are critical to the success of any learning experience.
See Elizabeth M. Bloom, A Law School Game Changer: (Trans)formative Feedback, 41
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 227, 232 (2015) (citing studies documenting the efficacy of formative
assessment); Paula J. Manning, Understanding the Impact of Inadequate Feedback: A
Means to Reduce Law Student Psychological Distress, Increase Motivation, and Improve
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the opportunity to receive appropriate feedback and may develop bad
habits. While some judges may be kind enough to offer corrections to a
wayward student, a judge cannot replace a supervisor who occupies the
same litigation role as the student—that of an advocate. Ultimately, providing
feedback is the responsibility of the supervisor and a fundamental part of
experiential education.28
Another failure to ensure adequate supervision stems from the model
rule not limiting students practice to law school programs, such as clinics
and externships.29 Currently, only nine states and the District of Columbia
limit student practice to clinics or law school administered externships.30
Six states allow students to practice in clinics after earning zero to fortyfive credits, and then outside of a law school program after earning thirty
to sixty credits.31 The remaining states have no such limitations.32 The
phenomenon of student practice outside the confines of any law school
program raises the question of whether student practice is necessarily
educational, which will be discussed at length in Part IV. 33 Unaffiliated
student practice also raises the question of supervisor accountability.
Although supervising lawyers may be considered responsible for certain
subordinate conduct under rules of professional conduct, those rules fail

Learning Outcomes, 43 CUMB. L. REV. 225, 228 (2013) (noting that feedback is an
essential part of learning).
This is particularly true in experiential learning settings. See Victor M. Goode, There Is
A Method(ology) to This Madness: A Review and Analysis of Feedback in the Clinical
Process, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 223, 224 (2000) (arguing that feedback “is of singular importance
to nearly every aspect of clinical teaching”).
28. Id.
29. 1969 A.B.A. Report, supra note 11, at 290–92.
30. See D.C. CT. APP. R. 48; HAW. SUP. CT. R. 7; IOWA CT. R. 31.15 (allowing
students to continue to practice in their field placement, even when no longer earning
credit); KY. SUP. CT. R. 2.540; LA. SUP. CT. R. XX; MD. R. 19-217; MISS. CODE ANN. §§
73-3-201–73-3-211 (2011); N.M. R. CIV. P. 1-094; S.C. APP. CT. R. 401(a), (d)(1)–(3);
TENN. SUP. CT. R. 7 § 10.03.
31. CONN. R. SUPER. CT. § 3-16(a)(2); KAN. SUP. CT. R. 719(i)(3); N.H. SUP. CT. R.
36; OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, § 2.1 (2018); OR. SUP. CT. R. 13.20; TEX. R. GOV. SUPERVISED PRAC.
L. QUALIFIED L. STUDENTS & QUALIFIED UNLICENSED L. SCH. GRADUATES R. II.
32. See ALA. R. LEGAL INTERNSHIP L. STUDENTS R. IV(B); ALASKA BAR R. 44;
ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 39(c); CAL. R. CT. 9.42; IDAHO BAR COMM’N R. 226; MONT. STUDENT
PRAC. R.; NEB. SUP. CT. R. § 3-703; NEV. SUP. CT. R. 49.3; 27 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 01C
.0201–.0206; N.D. STATE CT. R. LTD. PRAC. OF L. BY L. STUDENTS III; PA. B.A.R. 321, 322;
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 16-18-2.1–16-18-2.10 (2011); VT. R. ADMISSION BAR R. 21, 22;
VA. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 15.
33. This is not to say that nothing can be learned from work, internship, or volunteer
experiences that do not involve the level of supervision imposed in a clinic or externship
setting. Valuable lessons arise in a wide variety of life experiences. However, not all life
experiences meet the standards for an academic program.
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to account for the unique circumstances of student practice.34 The ethics
rules assume either independent professional licensure and judgment on
the part of a lawyer supervisee or that the supervisee is a non-lawyer who
is not engaged in the practice of law.35 Law student practice fits neither
of those assumptions.
Supervision is essential not only to ensure quality of services delivered,36
but also to preserve the educational experience of student practice.37 A
rich and rigorous educational experience is available in any well managed
in-house clinic.38 High-quality externship programs can also offer a valuable
learning experience for students. The academic literature as well as ABA
standards reflects that an externship should be overseen by a law school
faculty member who is focused on providing a meaningful and challenging
educational experience for students.39 The ABA further requires that all
law schools assess for pedagogical efficacy in all programs, including clinics
and externships.40 Notably, no such assessment is required for student
practice that occurs outside the purview of law school programs.
Where students practice in the community through externship programs,
ensuring the quality of site supervision generally requires active involvement
of a faculty member, site supervisor training, a classroom component for

34. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (holding the
supervisory lawyer responsible for certain subordinate conduct).
35. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
36. The legal profession requires passage of the bar exam as a means of ensuring
that new lawyers meet a minimum competency standard. Student practice functions as a
waiver to that requirement, allowing students to practice prior to establishing their
competency by passing the bar exam. As such, student practice relies upon supervision to
ensure minimum competency of those services delivered by a student. For more on this,
see infra Part IV.
37. See Ann Shalleck & Jane H. Aiken, Supervision: A Conceptual Framework, in
SUSAN BRYANT, ELLIOTT S. MILSTEIN & ANN C. SHALLECK, TRANSFORMING THE EDUCATION
OF LAWYERS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CLINICAL PEDAGOGY 169 (2014) (asserting
that quality supervision is essential for student learning).
38. See Jordan, supra note 9, at 342 (referring to the “unique educational benefits”
of an in-house clinic).
39. See AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL
OF LAW SCHOOLS 2020–2021, at 19–20 (2020) (mandating standard 304, which sets forth
various requirements for experiential courses); Barbara A. Blanco & Sande L. Buhai,
Externship Field Supervision: Effective Techniques for Training Supervisors and Students,
10 CLINICAL L. REV. 611, 612 (2004) (“Effective supervision is acknowledged as the most
essential element of law student training in an off-campus setting or externship.”).
40. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 39, at 25 (mandating standard 315, which requires
law schools to implement and assess learning outcomes).
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externship students, and site visits.41 Not only are these elements necessary
to ensure the integrity of the educational program, but most are required
by the ABA standards for legal education.42 In writing about the qualities
of effective externship field supervision, Professors Barbara A. Blanco &
Sande L. Buhai wrote:
Effective supervision is acknowledged as the most essential element of law student
training in an off-campus setting or externship. The importance of effective field
supervision is demonstrated in a growing body of literature addressing the theories of
effective supervision and the nature of student learning.43

Though practitioners who are capable of providing educationally valuable
and rigorous student practice experiences even outside of an externship
program exist, structural realities make it unlikely that such practitioners
represent the norm. The pressures of law practice are fundamentally at odds
with the investment of time and energy necessary to cultivate such an
experience. As will be discussed further in Part IV.B, the pedagogical goals
of student practice are robust and working to meet those goals is timeconsuming for the supervisor.
Blanco and Buhai went on to identify obstacles of ensuring high-quality
field supervision even in an externship setting:
Yet the practical mechanics of implementing an off-campus program in which
supervisors are consistently motivated and trained to incorporate the educational
goals of the institution into a busy practice and in which students are likewise
consistently motivated and trained to initiate guidance, clarification and selfassessment, eludes all but the most experienced program directors.44

This emphasis on an experienced externship program director is critical.
Externship program directors are tasked with ensuring that students are
placed with field supervisors who will provide adequate supervision. While
the highest-performing students may take the initiative to seek out the
resources and support necessary to succeed in a trial-by-fire environment,
a good externship director ensures that those resources and support are
available to all students. Externship directors also help students integrate
the learning that occurs in their field work.
Given these challenges, the likelihood of a student obtaining a high-quality,
educational student practice experience outside a formal law school program
41. See generally Blanco & Buhai, supra note 39 (discussing effective supervision
of law externs in field placement programs).
42. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 39. For more details on what constitutes a thoughtfullydesigned and well-managed externship, see Cynthia Adams et al., Upward! Higher: How
a Law Faculty Stays Ahead of the Curve, 51 IND. L. REV. 415, 428–38 (2018) and Harriet
N. Katz, The Past and Future of Externship Scholarship, 23 CLINICAL L. REV. 397 (2016).
43. Blanco & Buhai, supra note 39.
44. Id.
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such as a clinic or externship is small.45 Most practitioners are ill-prepared
to provide the training, support, and supervision—that is, time—necessary
to empower a student to not only provide a quality service to the client but
also learn from the experience. Instead, for example, students may be sent
to crowded dockets without supervisors, where they are subject to unfair
pressures and given inappropriate power and discretion.46 In such a scenario,
the student’s development is undermined, and the quality of service provided
to the public is compromised. This failure can occur because unlike law school
programs, unaffiliated student practice is not subject to any accountability
structure ensuring that students placed in such settings are actually learning.47
B. Susceptibility to Financial Pressures
Current student practice rules in many states, following the model rule,
fail to regulate financial pressures around student practice of law.48 These
financial pressures may influence the triad of client, student, and supervisor
in ways that jeopardize student learning and client service. Such financial
pressures are particularly dangerous when combined with other provisions
that create laxity in the regulation of student practice. For example, risks
to students and clients increase when unchecked financial incentives
occur in student practice settings that are not affiliated with law school
programming.49 Problematic financial pressures stem from each of two
model rule provisions widely adopted by states across the country: first,

45. This is not to say that there is no value to a law clerk internship experience in
which a student observes and supports the practice of a licensed attorney, even outside of
a law school program. However, there are critical differences between a law clerk model
and a student practice model, in which the student actually represents clients and provides
legal services herself. The latter requires intensive training, support, and supervision, which is
beyond the scope of what most law practices can provide to students who are unlikely to
yield a return on that investment—that is, a benefit to the law practice—within a semester
or even an academic year.
46. For example, in Kansas, law students are permitted to handle low-level prosecution
dockets without a supervisor present. KAN. SUP. CT. R. 719(i)(3).
47. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 39, at 25 (mandating standard 315, which requires
law schools to implement and assess learning outcomes).
48. See infra notes 71, 76–78 and accompanying text.
49. This Article does not suggest that no unaffiliated student practice supervisor
could ever provide high-quality supervision. However, the financial and practical conditions
of unaffiliated student practice in many states do not support quality supervision. Further,
in those states, there is no provision of the rules to ensure or even encourage quality
supervision or require any pedagogical value whatsoever for student practice of law.
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the 1979 removal of the client indigency requirement,50 and second, allowance
of student compensation and client billing.51 This subsection will discuss
each of these provisions in turn, noting how they interact with one another.
This Article does not take a position in the debate about paid externships.52
The point made here is simply that financial pressures can degrade both
pedagogical and service outcomes of student practice, particularly when
student practice occurs outside the purview of law school programs.
Therefore, financial pressures must be balanced within the context of a
rule that ensures high-quality supervision and focus on student learning.
Early efforts to promote clinical legal education on a national stage
were imbued with the sense that public interest was a fundamental part of
the clinical education model.53 The ABA’s 1969 Report from the Section
of Judicial Administration spoke of law students representing “indigent
persons” in “legal aid, public defender and like programs which are essential
to the requirement of furnishing competent legal services for all.” 54
Prosecutor’s offices were part of the vision as well.55 The original model
rule limited student practice to representing only indigent clients or prosecutor’s
offices.56 The model rule disallowed direct compensation from client to
student, but did allow lawyers, law schools, legal aid offices, and governments
to both pay student practitioners and charge clients for services rendered.57
Thus, financial interests were at play in the original model rule, but balanced
within the context of public interest and public service limitations on
student practice.

50. 1979 A.B.A. Report, supra note 11 (removing the indigency requirement from
the model rule and broadening its purpose section).
51. 1969 A.B.A. Report, supra note 11, at 291 (“Neither ask for nor receive any
compensation or renumeration of any kind for his services from the person on whose
behalf he renders services, but this shall not prevent a lawyer, legal aid bureau, law school,
public defender agency, or the State from paying compensation to the eligible law student,
nor shall it prevent any agency from making such charges for its services as it may
otherwise properly require.”).
52. See infra note 76.
53. See Barry, Dubin & Joy, supra note 13, at 12.
54. 1969 A.B.A. Report, supra note 11, at 290.
55. For a discussion of concerns unique to students practicing as prosecutors, see
supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text. Those concerns are relevant here because
prosecutor’s offices may face tight budgets and have a motivation to see students as an
affordable labor source without regard to the need for significant investment of supervisor
time. This may be true of legal aid and defender’s offices as well, but some states have
less-restrictive supervision requirements for student practitioner’s acting as prosecutors.
See, e.g., CAL. R. CT. 9.42(d)(4)(b); KAN. SUP. CT. R. 719(i)(3). Overall, the interplay of
supervision and financial concerns is strong, and this subpart must be read and balanced
with subpart A above.
56. 1969 A.B.A. Report, supra note 11, at 290–91.
57. Id. at 291.
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Ten years after first promulgating the model rule, the ABA removed the
rule’s indigency requirement.58 Although the purpose section indicated a
continued focus on service-learning and access to justice,59 without the
indigency limitation, there was no provision left in the model rule to ensure
that purpose was effectuated.60 Today, many states allow students to practice
law on behalf of any client, regardless of financial means,61 thus inviting
the potential for private sector profit motives into the paradigm of student
practice. Those profit motives pose a risk to both students and clients that
their interests may be subjugated to financial concerns of a supervisor.62
Furthermore, without a concrete commitment to serving poor or marginalized
people, those states have essentially abandoned service-learning goals of
student practice, such as teaching relational skills and justice, discussed
in Part IV.B. below.
One argument against a requirement that student practice clients be
indigent is that such a requirement creates an administrative burden on
law schools and courts in the administration of student practice permits.63

58. 1979 A.B.A. Report, supra note 11.
59. Id. The purpose statement in both the 1969 and 1979 versions included the
following language: “The bench and the bar are primarily responsible for providing competent
legal services for all persons, including those unable to pay for the services.” Id.; 1969
A.B.A. Report, supra note 11, at 290. This component is the “access to justice” purpose.
Moreover, both versions included the following language: “[to] encourage law schools to
provide clinical instruction in trial work of varying kinds . . . .” 1979 A.B.A. Report, supra
note 11; 1969 A.B.A. Report, supra note 11, at 290. This component is the “service-learning”
purpose.
60. 1979 A.B.A. Report, supra note 11 (removing the indigency requirement, which was
in the 1969 version).
61. See, e.g., ALA. R. LEGAL INTERNSHIP L. STUDENTS R. III; ALASKA BAR R. 44;
CAL. R. CT. 9.42; CONN. R. SUPER. Ct. §§ 3-14–3-21; IDAHO BAR COMM’N R. 226; MONT.
STUDENT PRAC. R.; NEB. SUP. CT. R. §§ 3-701–3-706; TEX. R. GOV. SUPERVISED PRAC. L.
QUALIFIED L. STUDENTS & QUALIFIED UNLICENSED L. SCH. GRADUATES; VT. R. ADMISSION
BAR R. 21–24; VA. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 15; WASH. ADMISSION & PRAC. R. 9; WIS. SUP.
CT. R. 50.
62. Some may also be concerned that the profit-driven model of student practice creates
unnecessary competition between students and the private bar. Peter A. Joy, Political
Interference with Clinical Legal Education: Denying Access to Justice, 74 TUL. L. REV.
235, 258 (1999) (“In permitting law students the right to practice law under student practice
rules, a state supreme court may be concerned about some practicing lawyers losing potential
clients to clinical programs.”).
63. During recent rule reform efforts in Kansas, some advocates asked the Supreme
Court to remove the indigency requirement because it would be difficult to administer with
respect to programs in rural areas and entity representation. See Letter from Stephen Mazza,
Dean, Univ. of Kan. Sch. of L., et al., to Barry L. Garrison, Admissions Adm’r, Clerk
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However, there is no evidence that states with indigency requirements
experience any administrative issues. 64 Another argument against an
indigency requirement is the fact that many people in rural communities—
even those who are able to afford an attorney—are subject to a lawyer
shortage.65 Similarly, there may be individuals and entities facing access
to justice barriers other than finances, unable to obtain legal services for a
variety of reasons.66 The District of Columbia offers an elegant solution
to this concern, allowing student practitioners to represent “any client who
is indigent or who, because of limited financial ability or the nature of the
claim, would be unlikely to obtain legal representation, or any non-profit
organization . . . .”67 Professors Wallace Mlyniec and Haley Etchison explained
that the rules committee wanted to expand access to representation to all
“‘under-served persons’ and leave it to the good faith of the clinical directors
to implement the rule.”68 Because D.C. limits student practice exclusively
to clinical programs,69 the discretion necessary for the implementation of
the rule is left to those who teach in experiential learning programs within
law schools.70

of the Supreme Ct. (February 9, 2018) (on file with the University of San Diego School
of Law Library) (establishing that the University of Kansas School of Law asked the court
to remove the indigency requirement from Kansas’s student practice rule).
64. No reported cases reflect an accusation that a student represented a non-indigent
person. In an in-house clinic, professional discretion of the supervisor is sufficient to
navigate this issue.
65. This argument was also made during recent rule reform efforts in Kansas. See
Letter from Stephen Mazza et al. to Barry L. Garrison, supra note 63. Although the rural
justice gap disproportionately affects the poor, wealthier rural residents are not immune.
See April Simpson, Wanted: Lawyers for Rural America, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (June
26, 2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2019/06/26/
wanted-lawyers-for-rural-america [https://perma.cc/4H3R-SZMS].
66. For example, a hearing may be set so near in the future that it would be impossible
to obtain a private practice attorney before the hearing, as in the case of domestic violence
protection orders. See, e.g., W. George Senft, Restraining Orders and Domestic Violence,
OR. STATE BAR (Aug. 2018), https://www.osbar.org/public/legalinfo/1140_restraining
orders.htm [https://perma.cc/PTZ7-XNS9]. A law school clinic collocated with other agencies
in a courthouse domestic violence intake center may be prepared to immediately accept
such a case for representation when the client would not have time to obtain private counsel.
67. D.C. CT. APP. R. 48(a)(1). Washburn University School of Law advocated for
a similar approach in Kansas during rule reform efforts. See Letter from Stephen Mazza
et al. Barry L. Garrison, supra note 63. However, the Kansas Supreme Court removed the
indigency requirement altogether. KAN. SUP. CT. R. 719.
68. Mlyniec & Etchison, supra note 12, at 232.
69. D.C. CT. APP. R. 48(a)(1), (b)(1).
70. Id. Missouri provides an alternative approach, allowing certified students to
represent any clinic client but only indigent persons, or the state, outside the clinic context.
MO. SUP. CT. R. 13.01(a).
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The second source of financial incentives arising from the model rule is
indirect student compensation and client billing.71 The model rule barred
a student from requesting or receiving “any compensation or renumeration of
any kind for his services from the person on whose behalf he renders
services . . . .”72 However, the rule went on to state that “this shall not
prevent a lawyer, legal aid bureau, law school, public defender agency, or
the State from paying compensation to the eligible law student, nor shall
it prevent any agency from making such charges for its services as it may
otherwise properly require.” 73 Many states continue to use the same or
substantially similar language in their student practice rules today.74 Other
states are silent on the issues of fees and compensation.75
The bar on “direct” compensation leaves a great deal of ambiguity for
financial incentives to influence student practice. This is particularly true
when students are serving higher-income clients and practicing outside of
law school programs. The propriety of student compensation in externships
is a source of debate in the field. 76 The most significant objection to
compensated externships is that compensation undermines the educational
integrity of student practice by introducing financial motives that militate
against good supervision.77 Those who support compensated externships

71. 1969 A.B.A. Report, supra note 11, at 291.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., ALA. R. LEGAL INTERNSHIP L. STUDENTS R. IV(F); ARIZ. SUP. CT. R.
39(c)(4)(A)(ii); ARK. R. GOV. ADMISSION TO THE BAR R. XV(C); COLO. R. CIV. P.
205.7(2)(a)(i); CONN. R. SUPER. CT. § 3-16(b); DEL. SUP. CT. R. 56(c); GA. R. SUP. CT.
92(c); HAW. SUP. CT. R. 7.4(b); IDAHO BAR COMM’N R. 226(j); ME. R. CIV. P. 90(b)(4);
MO. SUP. CT. R. 13.02(c); MONT. STUDENT PRAC. R. V(E); NEB. SUP. CT. R. § 3-703(F);
27 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 01C.0203(e); N.D. STATE CT. R. LTD. PRAC. OF L. BY L. STUDENTS
III(E); OHIO GOV. BAR R. II § 6; OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, § 9.1 (2018); PA. B.A.R 321(a)(5)(iiii); S.C. APP. CT. R. 401(d)(4); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 16-18-2.2(5) (2011); TEX. R. GOV.
SUPERVISED PRAC. L. QUALIFIED L. STUDENTS & QUALIFIED UNLICENSED L. SCH.
GRADUATES R. IX; VT. R. ADMISSION BAR R. 24(f); VA. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 15(b)(v);
W.V. R. ADMISSION PRAC. L. R. 10.1(e); WIS. SUP. CT. R. 50.08.
75. See, e.g., ALASKA BAR R. 44; CAL. R. CT. 9.42; MICH. CT. R. 8.120; N.J. CT. R.
1:21–23; N.M. R. CIV. P. 1-094.
76. See, e.g., James H. Backman, Law School Externships: Reevaluating Compensation
Policies to Permit Paid Externships, 17 CLINICAL L. REV. 21, 29 (2010); Niki Kuckes,
Designing Law School Externships That Comply with the FLSA, 21 CLINICAL L. REV. 79,
79 (2014).
77. See Backman, supra note 76, at 49.
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say programmatic design and implementation can protect pedagogical
interests against financial ones, or at least balance the two.78
Regardless of one’s views on whether externships should be paid, that
is a separate question from whether students working outside externship
programs—and outside any law school program—should be compensated
for practicing law, particularly in the private sector and on behalf of highincome clients. The original model rule placed important constraints on
the financial incentives for student practice by limiting all student practice
to serving indigent clients or the state.79 Although students could be paid
for their work under the Model Rule,80 economic interests were originally
moderated by the fact that student practice clients were necessarily poor.81
Once the indigency limitation was removed in 1979, 82 that check on
financial incentives was lost. Today, in states that follow the model rule,
a student can earn a salary from a private-sector employer who bills clients
for the student’s work. Thus, supervisors may see certified law student
practitioners as inexpensive fee-generating labor without properly considering
the intense commitment that is supervising a student.
C. Erosion of Client Autonomy
Although client consent was a key feature of the 1969 model student
practice rule,83 many states have deviated from that approach. 84 The
model rule required the student to obtain written consent from the client
or state and required the supervising attorney to file that consent with the
court and “[bring the consent] to the attention” of the judge or presiding
officer.85 These requirements ensured that student practice would occur
with both client and supervisor consent, imposing upon the student the
burden of obtaining that consent. That burden carried both practical and
pedagogical value. As a practical matter, clients would be informed of the
78. Id.
79. 1969 A.B.A. Report, supra note 11, at 290–91 (limiting students to representing
indigent persons in civil and criminal matters, II(A), and representing the State in criminal
matters, II(B)).
80. Id. at 291 (allowing students to be paid for their work under the model student
practice rule so long as they did not bill clients directly).
81. Id. at 290–91. See also Backmun, supra note 76, at 28 (noting service of indigent
persons will not yield compensation).
82. See 1979 A.B.A. Report, supra note 11 (removing the indigency requirement
from the model rule and broadening its purpose section).
83. 1969 A.B.A. Report, supra note 11, at 290 (allowing student representation “if
the person on whose behalf he is appearing has indicated in writing his consent to that
appearance and the supervising lawyer has also indicated in writing approval of that
appearance . . . .”).
84. See infra notes 86–87.
85. 1969 A.B.A. Report, supra note 11, at 290–91.
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students’ status and have the opportunity to decide whether to be represented
by a student. Further, by requiring students to take multiple actions to
establish and document client consent, the model rule demonstrated the
importance of client autonomy and ensured that students spent a meaningful
amount of time concerning themselves with client consent. This signaled
to students that client autonomy matters.
Despite the helpful example the model rule set on this particular point,
client consent has been marginalized in many states. In several states,
written client consent is only required for lawyering activities that take
place in court.86 In a number of other states, client consent is not required
at all.87 This erosion of emphasis on client consent is troubling, first as a
matter of autonomy—and constitutional rights. Clients should be well
informed that their representatives are law students. It is easy enough for
a client to become confused about a law student’s status as a non-lawyer;
thus, affirmative measures should be required to combat that potential
confusion. Properly obtaining and documenting client consent may be
particularly important in cases involve a constitutional right to counsel.88
Second, weak or nonexistent client consent requirements teach students
that client consent, and thus client autonomy, is unimportant. This lesson
runs counter to many of the goals of student practice as discussed in Part
IV below.
D. Focus on In-Court Practice
Everything about the model rule reflected the idea that student practice
would be a phenomenon that took place within the walls of the courtroom.
In the preamble, student practice was mentioned twice—each referencing
in-court practice.89 The first section of the model rule laid out a twofold
purpose: first, to provide representation to indigent clients and second, “to
encourage law schools to provide clinical instruction in trial work of varying

86. See, e.g., HAW. SUP. CT. R. 7; LA. SUP. CT. R. XX; CAL. R. CT. 9.42; NEB. SUP.
CT. R. § 3-703; ME. R. CIV. P. 90; N.J. CT. R. 1:21–23; MO. SUP. CT. R. 13.
87. See, e.g., N.M. R. CIV. P. 1-094; MD. R. 19-217(d); KY. SUP. CT. R. 2.540; MISS.
CODE ANN. § 73-3-207.
88. See Peter A. Joy & Robert R. Kuehn, Conflict of Interest and Competency Issues
in Law Clinic Practice, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 493, 570 (2002) (discussing cases in which
courts have found a defendant’s right to counsel necessitates certain protections associated
with student practice, such as specific informed consent).
89. 1969 A.B.A. Report, supra note 11, at 290.

513

58-3_CHADWICK_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

9/7/2021 4:23 PM

kinds . . . .”90 The activities contemplated for law students to perform were
all court appearances.91 Nearly every section of the rule mentioned court
appearances. Even the “other activities” section contemplated only litigationrelated tasks.92 The rule authorized preparation of pleadings briefs and other
documents “to be filed,” assistance for inmates seeking postconviction relief,
and oral argument in appellate court.93
Although student practice may have been initially imagined in the
courtroom, today’s clinic students practice in a variety of settings and engage
in a variety of functions, including transactional lawyering.94 Some readers
may argue that student practice was designed as a court-based concept because
supervised out-of-court student practice does not require special authorization
since the supervisor is ultimately responsible for the student’s work. That
is not entirely accurate. Even in litigation, the practice of law extends well
beyond the courtroom and preparation of court filings; a law license is
required for many of those activities.95 Litigators, like their transactional
counterparts, counsel clients, render legal advice, and make decisions about
legal strategy.96 These are critical lawyering activities that form a large
part of many clinical practices.97 Certainly, engaging in many of these tasks
as a non-lawyer would be considered unauthorized practice of law.98 Unlike
paralegals, student-attorneys do not simply pass advice from supervising
attorneys to clients. Student practice is about a student asserting professional
judgment and engaging in lawyering activities. Though a supervisor may
be supporting and monitoring the student’s work, that can be done without
usurping the student’s professional autonomy.
Because some states still fail to fully recognize out-of-court practice in
their student practice rules, many clinicians and externship directors live
with a student practice rule that do not expressly authorize the work that
students do in their programs.99 Simply acquiescing to a student practice

90. Id.
91. Id. at 290–91.
92. Id. at 291.
93. Id.
94. See KUEHN, supra note 1 (“Sixty-two percent of overall clinic work is focused
on litigation/dispute resolution, 19% is primarily transactional, 9% primarily legislative or
policy work, and 6% primarily regulatory.”).
95. See, e.g., Bennion, Van Camp, Hagen & Ruhl v. Kassler Escrow, Inc., 635 P.2d
730, 732 (Wash. 1981).
96. Id.
97. See KUEHN, supra note 1.
98. See, e.g., Ruhl, 635 P.2d at 732 (“practice of law” includes giving legal advice
and preparing legal instruments).
99. See, e.g., CONN. R. SUPER. CT. §§ 3-14, 3-17 (stating student may appear in
court and prepare litigation-related documents); DEL. SUP. CT. R. 56 (stating student may
appear in court); IOWA CT. R. 31.15(1) (stating student may appear in court); MASS. S.J.C.
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rule regime that does not, by its letter, authorize the activities performed
by students creates a number of problems. First, it exposes the faculty and
students to potential liability for unauthorized practice of law.100 Second,
it undermines the pedagogical mission and integrity of experiential education,
teaching students a troubling lesson. When students first entering into law
practice are told, either directly or by implication, they should ignore or
stretch the rule that authorizes them to practice, those students may take
away the troubling message that when an ethics rule does not authorize what
you want to do, you can just ignore the rule. Students may also conclude
that they are not capable of analyzing the law without their supervisor telling
them what it really means. The supervisor essentially says, “I know the rule
says no, but I say yes.” This reinforces the notion that the student is not
knowledgeable enough to understand and follow basic court rules.101
The damage caused by an underinclusive scope of practice may not be
catastrophic on its face, but it does chip away at the ethical foundation of
student practice. Requiring students to essentially ignore the letter of the
rule that authorizes them to practice sets a troubling precedent at the foundation
of initiation into the profession. This is particularly problematic because
student practice supervisors are expected to instill in students the highest
standards of practice and ethics.102 While skilled clinicians may teach
around this problem by helping students name and contextualize the issue,
a clearer student practice rule would obviate that need and create a stronger
ethical foundation for student practice. Outside of a clinic setting, supervisors
may be less likely to recognize and correct for the damage caused by an
underinclusive scope provision.
III. HISTORY OF THE STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
Professors Margaret Martin Barry, Jon C. Dubin, and Peter A. Joy have
written an extensive history of the development of clinical legal education

R. 3:03(1) (stating student may appear in court); VT. R. ADMISSION BAR R. 21, 24 (stating
student may appear in court and conduct other litigation-related activities).
100. See, e.g., N.Y. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 5.5.
101. High-quality clinical education positions the student in the role of primary
attorney, encouraging the student to engage in strategic thinking and analysis, rather than
relying on the professor for executive guidance. A rule that requires reinterpretation by
the professor in order to reconcile the student’s behavior with the letter of the rule
undermines the development of student autonomy.
102. Joy & Kuehn, supra note 88, at 499.
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in their book Clinical Education for This Millennium: The Third Wave.103
This Part will not recount that history, but will instead focus specifically
on the development of the rules that have governed student practice,
beginning with the American Bar Association’s 1967 resolution calling for
the adoption of student practice rules. That resolution set up the ABA’s
passage of a model student practice rule two years later. The model rule,
which was amended in 1979, has functioned as a template for student practice
in nearly every U.S. jurisdiction, sometimes with very little variation.104
A. Resolution Calling for Student Practice Rules
In 1967, the ABA House of Delegates adopted a resolution submitted
by the Section on Legal Education and Admissions regarding student
practice. That simple resolution called for the adoption of student practice
rules.105 At that time, thirteen states allowed for law students to appear in
court under supervision.106 The resolution called for courts to pass rules
permitting third-year students to appear in court under “adequate supervision . . .
on behalf of indigent persons or the prosecution in both criminal and civil
matters in connection with the stated functions of public defender, legal
aid and like programs.”107 Without including any proposed model rule,
the resolution urged “in principle” the adoption of such rules.108 A second
paragraph, which called for federal funding for “the development and
operation of organized programs of instruction” in law school clinical
programs,109 was separated from the first due to the controversy it apparently
generated.110 Despite its detractors, the second paragraph ultimately passed
as well.111 It is noteworthy that the two-part resolution included not only
a call for rules to allow student practice, but also funding to allow the practice
to be done within an “organized program[] of instruction.”112
The 1967 resolution was sparse, but it contained several key features
that began to shape student practice as we know it.113 First, the resolution
was framed in terms of the dual mission of student practice—education
103. Barry, Dubin & Joy, supra note 13, at 9–10.
104. See infra Part III.C.
105. Annual Report of the American Bar Association, 92 AM. BAR ASS’N. 662 (1967)
[hereinafter 1967 A.B.A. Report].
106. Id.
107. Id. at 326.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 662.
110. Id. at 326–27.
111. Id. at 327.
112. Id.
113. Id. (The resolution was limited to indigent persons and prosecution, which have
been adopted by states over time).
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and service.114 Second, adequate supervision was one of the only practical
considerations mentioned in the resolution.115 That priority was emphasized
by the inclusion of a proposal to encourage funding for “organized programs
of instruction.”116 Finally, the resolution suggested that student practice
clients would be “indigent persons or the prosecution”—which underscored
the service mission, through which students could supplement legal services
available to the poor.117 Overall, the 1967 resolution represented the servicelearning mission of experiential legal education.118
B. Passage of the 1969 Model Rule
In 1969, the ABA House of Delegates adopted a resolution proposed by
the Section on Judicial Administration for a model rule of student practice
along with a report containing the text of a Proposed Model Rule Relative
to Legal Assistance by Law Students.119 According to that report, the proposed
rule was provided to the general assembly “in connection with the
responsibility to provide legal services to all persons.”120 The aim of the
model rule was to expand “legal aid, public defender and similar programs
which are essential to the requirement of furnishing competent legal
services for all.”121 The rule was “intended to insure careful supervision
of the work of the law students at every stage of their participation in trials
and at the same time to give the students enough freedom of action so that
they could make a genuine contribution to the proceedings.”122 Passage
of the model rule was an incredibly important step in the advancement of
the clinical education movement and experiential learning in the United

114. See id. at 662 (referring to the value of “clinical experience with legal aid
societies, public defenders, and district attorney offices. . . .”).
115. Id. at 326.
116. Id. at 662.
117. Id. This resolution also seeded a troubling relationship between student practice
and prosecutor’s offices. See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text.
118. Barry, Dubin & Joy, supra note 13, at 12 (“The earliest forms of clinical legal
education embraced the dual goals of hands-on training in lawyering skills and provision
of access to justice for traditionally unrepresented clients.”).
119. 1969 A.B.A. Report, supra note 11, at 118.
120. Id. at 290.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 118.
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States, giving rise to a rapid spread of state student practice rules across
the country.123
C. Explosion of State Student Practice Rules
Jurisdictions that did not yet have a student practice rule quickly adopted
the model rule after it was promulgated by the ABA.124 By 1973, forty
out of the forty-four states in which a law school was located had student
practice rules in place.125 There seemed to be a recognition that the primary
purpose of the clinical model was educational, with a strong service
component.126 Steven Leleiko said in an essay published by the Council
on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility, “While the service
the students afford is terribly important, it is secondary. This means that
there should be no pressure for clinics to handle high caseloads that foster
a lower quality of work no matter who is doing it.”127 Leleiko critiqued
the early legal aid model of clinical practice, noting the failure of that model
to deliver on the educational objectives of the clinic experience. 128
D. Removal of the Indigency Restriction
In 1979, the ABA House of Delegates revisited its model rule and,
without debate, removed the indigency restriction from both the purpose
statement and the provision describing what student practitioners are
authorized to do.129 The Section of Legal Admission to the Bar explained
in its report that the indigency requirement “severely and unnecessarily
restricts the educational opportunities of students and the opportunities of
law school faculties to provide their students with a broad range of practical
experience.”130 Apparently concerned that students were not sufficiently
exposed to the legal challenges of those in higher income brackets, the
section recommended replacing the phrase “As one means of providing
assistance to lawyers who represent clients unable to pay for such services
and to encourage law schools to provide clinical instruction in trial work
of varying kinds” with “To encourage law schools to provide clinical
123. See Barry, Dubin & Joy, supra note 13, at 20–21 (documenting the cascade of
states following passage of the 1969 model rule and largely adopting the rule).
124. See id. at 20.
125. See Steven Leleiko, Student Practice: A Commentary, in COUNCIL ON LEGAL
EDUC. FOR PRO. RESP., STATE RULES PERMITTING THE STUDENT PRACTICE OF LAW: COMPARISONS
AND COMMENTS 3 (2d ed. 1973).
126. See id. at 2.
127. Id. at 8.
128. See id. at 11.
129. 1979 A.B.A. Report, supra note 11, at 256.
130. Id. at 730.
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instruction in trial work of varying kinds which among other benefits
gives law students experience with clients from all walks of life.”131
IV. GOALS OF STUDENT PRACTICE
The legal profession has set certain standards that must be met before
granting licensure to a prospective lawyer. Practicing law without a license
is not only an ethical violation but also a crime.132 Student practice is an
exception to the general requirement that one must be licensed in order to
practice law.133 Unless that exception is premised upon a compelling
justification, it is simply an arbitrary loophole. The exception must also
carry assurances that those served by student practitioners will not receive
substandard legal services. Inadequate services not only fail to meet the
legal needs of the recipient, but also can materially harm their legal interests,
leaving them in worse condition than before receiving those services.134
The following subparts will explore the justification for student practice
by unpacking its specific goals. Part V will then explore how to ensure
the student practice rule supports those goals.
A. Service
Historically, one goal of student practice is to increase access to legal
services for those who could not otherwise obtain them. 135 Generally,
increasing access to justice has meant serving those who cannot afford legal
services, but it may also include serving those who are unable to hire a
lawyer for geographic reasons or due to the nature of the claim.136 If service
is a primary goal of student practice, then states would limit student practice
to public interest or public service work. Rather, in several states, students
can represent any client, without income or pro bono restrictions. 137
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., N.Y. R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT 5.5 (making unauthorized practice of law
an ethical violation); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 478 (Consol. 2020) (making unauthorized practice
of law a crime).
133. See Joy & Kuehn, supra note 88, at 497.
134. See id. at 521–22.
135. See supra Part III.B (discussing the original passage of the ABA model rule on
student practice).
136. See Suzanne Valdez Carey, An Essay on the Evolution of Clinical Legal
Education and Its Impact on Student Trial Practice, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 509, 528 (2003).
137. ALA. R. LEGAL INTERNSHIP L. STUDENTS R. II–III; ALASKA BAR R. 44; CAL. R.
CT. 9.42; IDAHO BAR COMM’N R. 226; MONT. STUDENT PRAC. R.; NEB. SUP. CT. R. §§ 3-
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Therefore, at least in those states, service does not seem to be a central
goal or purpose of student practice. In those states, educational goals, which
will be discussed below, form the primary or sole justification for student
practice.138
Whether student practice is justified by service per se, (for example,
solely to increase access to services, service-neutral experiential learning,
solely to educate students, or some combination of the two), basic quality
control of student practice is essential. That quality control is accomplished
through careful training and diligent supervision of student practitioners.
Well-considered structure must be in place to ensure student-provided
legal services are adequate. Thus, even in its service goal, student practice
has an educational component. Further, as will be discussed below, many
educators use service-oriented student practice to meet learning goals
related to empathy and justice.
B. Learning
The second historically rooted goal of student practice is to educate
students.139 Today, learning is a widely accepted goal of student practice.140
A great deal has been written on the goals of experiential education, particularly
clinical legal education, most of which I will not attempt to rehash. 141
Importantly, the goals of each program may vary. However, I will endeavor
to broadly define and describe some primary pedagogical goals of student
practice here, while acknowledging that this list is neither exhaustive nor
universally accepted.

702, 703; V T. R. ADMISSION BAR R. 21, 24; V A. R. P ROF’L CONDUCT 15; WASH.
ADMISSION & PRAC. R. 9; WIS. SUP. CT. R. 50.06, 50.08. Arizona’s rule begins with a
purpose statement that states, “This rule is adopted to encourage law schools to provide
clinical instruction of varying kinds and to facilitate volunteer opportunities for students
in pro bono contexts.” ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 39(c). However, nowhere in Arizona’s rule is
student practice expressly limited to those settings.
138. I say primary because it is possible that some states intend to increase access to
legal services by having more people practicing law in a variety of settings, including both
paid and pro bono work.
139. See supra Part III.B (discussing the original passage of the ABA model rule on
student practice).
140. See Susan Bryant, Elliott Milstein & Ann Shalleck, Learning Goals for Clinical
Programs, in SUSAN BRYANT, ELLIOTT S. MILSTEIN & ANN C. SHALLECK, TRANSFORMING
THE EDUCATION OF LAWYERS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CLINICAL PEDAGOGY 13–20
(2014).
141. See, e.g., id.; Carolyn Grose, Uncovering and Deconstructing the Binary:
Teaching (and Learning) Critical Reflection in Clinic and Beyond, 22 CLINICAL L. REV.
301, 315 (2016); Jane Harris Aiken, Striving to Teach “Justice, Fairness, and Morality,”
4 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 30–31 (2017).
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1. Lawyering Skills
The opportunity for students to learn lawyering skills through first-hand
practice of law in real cases can only be achieved through a student practice
paradigms. Much has been written about whether skills acquisition is an
appropriate aim of experiential education.142 However, the essence of the
dispute may simply be a question of focus. Skills skeptics remind experiential
educators to be intentional about where we place the focus—and frame
the purpose—of our teaching, arguing that task-based technical lawyering
skills should not consume the entire focus of experiential learning
opportunities. 143 There is no doubt that students do and should learn
technical lawyering skills in experiential learning courses. The question
is really how we define lawyering skills and why we teach them.
Regarding how skills are defined, it is critical to note that skills
include not only technical lawyering skills, but also “intra-personal,”144
“interpersonal,” 145 and “social/systemic”146 relational skills necessary to
be a successful lawyer. Professor Susan Brooks and her co-authors argue
that these “relational competencies” are not adequately emphasized in law
school curricula except in clinical programs.147 These relational competencies,
or relational skills, are uniquely important and may be overlooked in the
traditional debate over the role of skills acquisition in experiential education.
That debate has focused more on task-based technical skills such as
142. See, e.g., A.J. Goldsmith, An Unruly Conjunction? Social Thought and Legal
Action in Clinical Legal Education, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 415, 415 (1993) (“[A]n academically
challenging legal education requires that clinical legal education courses be more than just
exercises in skills acquisition for professional legal practice.”); Meredith J. Ross, A “Systems”
Approach to Clinical Legal Education, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 779, 779–82 (2007) (framing a
debate between a goal of skills acquisition versus social justice); Linda F. Smith, Designing an
Extern Clinical Program: Or As You Sow, So Shall You Reap, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 527,
527–28, 534 (1999) (extolling skills acquisition as a primary goal of experiential education).
143. See Goldsmith, supra note 142, at 417; Stephen Wizner, Beyond Skills Training,
7 CLINICAL L. REV. 327, 330 (2001).
144. Intra-personal skills include “self-awareness, critical self-reflection, and selfdirectedness.” Susan L. Brooks et al., Moving Towards a Competency-Based Model for Fostering
Law Students’ Relational Skills 3 (Mar. 1, 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
145. Interpersonal skills include “deep and reflective listening, empathy, compassion,
cross-cultural communication, and dialogue.” Id.
146. Social/systemic skills include “appreciating the role of cross-cultural aspects of
legal work writ large, along with multiple identities, implicit bias, privilege and power,
and structural racism.” Id.
147. See id.
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interviewing, counseling, strategy, fact investigation, written advocacy,
oral advocacy, negotiation, file documentation, and timekeeping.148 However,
it is notable that relational skills cannot be separated from many of these
so-called technical skills.149
Skills acquisition can be both a primary and a secondary goal of all
experiential education. Skills are valuable per se, as well as necessary to
serve other teaching goals, such as professional identity formation, critical
reflection, and justice.150 Professor Steve Wizner has argued that teaching
lawyering skills is a secondary component of experiential education, intended
to serve the primary goal of teaching justice. 151 He wrote, “As clinical
teachers we should engage with our students on a deeper level than simply
teaching them the craft of practicing law.”152 While the craft of practicing
law arguably includes relational skills as much as task-based technical
lawyering skills, experiential educators who wish to explicitly pursue relational
skills and other learning goals must set a clear intention to do so. In the
absence of clear intention, task-based, technical lawyering skills can have
a tendency to eclipse other teaching goals through the gravitational pull
of the daily work of the practice of law.153 Things must get done each day
to preserve the interests of the clients; thus, doing things can become the
point of experiential learning activities in the absence of mindful intention
toward a different purpose.154 Certainly, learning how to accomplish various
technical tasks is a valuable experience for students, but it is not the solitary
objective of experiential learning.

148. See, e.g., Wizner, supra note 143, at 330 (arguing against clinical teachers focusing
solely on “client-centered interviewing, counseling, fact investigation, negotiation, and
written and oral advocacy”); Smith supra note 142, at 528 (defining skills as, for example,
“trial advocacy, client interviewing, problem-solving, witness interviewing, client counseling,
negotiating, mediating, lobbying, [and] drafting”).
149. “Clinicians reach beyond the disaggregated conception of skills that sometimes
characterized ‘skills training’ to teach students that lawyering tasks are embedded in the
lawyering process, an approach that recognizes the complex interrelationships among the
many parts of a lawyer’s work.” Bryant, Milstein & Shalleck, supra note 140, at 20.
150. These goals will be discussed in Part III.B.2–4 below.
151. Id. at 338–39.
152. Id. at 331.
153. As an example of how skills acquisition can eclipse the other goals of clinical
teaching, I note that many institutions refer to the ABA’s experiential learning requirement
as the “skills requirement.” AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE
FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 2019–2020, at 16 (2019).
154. Nationwide declines in enrollment mean that student bodies are changing and
the need to focus on remedial training may be increasing for some clinicians. Peter A. Joy,
Challenges to Legal Education, Clinical Legal Education, and Clinical Scholarship, 26
CLINICAL L. REV. 237, 245–46 (2019).
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2. Professional Identity Formation
As Steven Leleiko said in his 1973 essay Student Practice: A Commentary,
“It is not an overstatement to aver that law student participation in client
representation is both an immediate way to express love for people and
the initiation of a life long effort to express personal creativity and human
concern through one’s profession.”155 A central goal of student practice
is to aid students in forming their professional identities.156 Essentially,
this means helping students determine who they want to be as lawyers and
by what values they want to live by in their careers.157 This includes what
type of practice students will go into, how they will treat clients, their work
ethic, their responsibility to the community, how they will interact with
the rules of professional responsibility, and what moral codes and values
will shape their work as lawyers. Dean Jane Aiken has written about clinical
education’s “transformational learning,” which she defines as creating
opportunities for reflection and reorientation of a student’s values.158
There are few other opportunities in a typical juris doctorate curriculum
for highly individualized professional identity formation to occur. Indeed,
the 2007 Carnegie Report named professional identity development as a
major weakness of law school curricula. 159 The report exalted the bestdesigned clinics as those in which students “encounter appealing representations
of professional ideals, connect in a powerful way with engaging models
of ethical commitment within the profession, and reflect on their emerging
professional identity in relation to those ideals and models.”160 Most
clinicians would agree that we are not morally neutral in guiding the
formation of students’ professional identities.161 Instead, clinicians strive

155. Leleiko, supra note 125, at 23.
156. Stephen Wizner, Is Social Justice Still Relevant?, 32 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 345,
351–52 (2012) (outlining the responsibilities clinicians have both as teachers and lawyers).
157. Id.
158. Aiken, supra note 141, at 2–3.
159. See WILLIAM M. S ULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: P REPARATION FOR
THE PROFESSION OF LAW 135 (2007).
160. Id.
161. See, e.g., Aiken, supra note 141, at 6–7. But c.f. Praveen Kosuri, X Marks the
Spot, 17 CLINICAL L. REV. 205, 208 (2010) (arguing that clinicians ought to be more
ideologically neutral in selecting social justice as a teaching tool but not viewing it as
a mission).
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to influence our students to be ethical, justice-minded, client-centered,
empathetic practitioners.162
3. Critical Reflection
I often tell students, “The point of clinic is not just to learn how to
handle this particular case; the point is to learn what to do when you don’t
know what to do.” This refrain speaks to one of the primary goals of
experiential education: to foster students’ development of a methodology
for critical reflection and thoughtful decision-making.163 This methodology
serves to shape students into better lawyers, because it sparks in them the
determination and clarity to: (1) identify options, (2) judiciously enlist available
resources, (3) make intentional choices, and (4) reflect and learn from
their experiences.164 Rather than teaching students to follow directions
handed down by the supervisor, good experiential educators help students
begin to see themselves as capable of creating their own work plan using
existing resources and retrospectively evaluating their work based on
internal metrics for success.165 This instills a level of independence and ease
that cannot generally be achieved through mimicry.166
Critical reflection also allows students to access a realm of meaningmaking not otherwise available in law school curricula. 167 Professor
Carolyn Grose defined critical reflection as “the process by which we selfconsciously locate ourselves within the system in which we are operating
and in relation to the other players in that system.” 168 Professor Grose
noted that this process allows practitioners to “identify what assumptions
are at work and the effect they are having on us, on the other players, and
on the system itself.”169 Critical reflection drives students to ask “why?,”
thus pushing them to question the status quo of socio-political power and

162. See Aiken, supra note 141, at 6; Wallace J. Mlyniec, Where to Begin? Training
New Teachers in the Art of Clinical Pedagogy, 18 CLINICAL L. REV. 505, 538 (2012); JoNel
Newman & Donald Nicolson, A Tale of Two Clinics: Similarities and Differences in Evidence
of the “Clinic Effect” on the Development of Law Students’ Ethical and Altruistic Professional
Identities, 35 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 33–34 (2017).
163. See Ann Shalleck, Clinical Contexts: Theory and Practice in Law and Supervision,
21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 109, 141 (1993–1994).
164. See Bryant, Milstein & Shalleck, supra note 140, at 19–21.
165. See Mlyniec & Etchison, supra note 12, at 523, 527, 569.
166. See DAVID F. CHAVKIN, CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION TEXTBOOK FOR LAW SCHOOL
CLINICAL PROGRAMS 7–10 (2002) (describing clinical teaching methodology using a “kitchen
organizer” metaphor for guided discovery learning).
167. See Newman & Nicolson, supra note 162.
168. Grose, supra note 141.
169. Id.
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inspiring students to find their role in changing that status quo for the
better.
Importantly, teaching critical reflection in experiential courses plants
the seed of critical reflection in a student’s future practice of law. Professor
Beryl Blaustone described this as “increasing students’ critical-minded
confidence so as to incorporate effective reflection habits for self-directed
assessment in future professional development.”170 Others call this, or
something like it, “learning for transfer” 171 or learning how to learn. 172
Regardless of the nomenclature they use, all good experiential educators
share the goal of teaching students to be more thoughtful and reflective in
their practice of law, both now and in their future careers.173
4. Teaching Justice
Although there are some who question the role of social justice in
experiential education,174 most clinicians view it as a fundamental part of
our pedagogical mission.175 This emphasis on justice is an important
feature of quality experiential education, particularly in the context of
traditional legal education. The persistent Langdellian approach to the

170. Beryl Blaustone, Teaching Law Students to Self-Critique and to Develop Critical
Clinical Self-Awareness in Performance, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 143, 150 (2006).
171. Carolyn Grose, Beyond Skills Training, Revisited: The Clinical Education Spiral, 19
CLINICAL L. REV. 489, 493–94 (2013) (citing Sharan B. Merrian & Brendan Leahy, Learning
Transfer: A Review of the Research in Adult Education and Training, 14 PAACE J.
LIFELONG LEARNING 1, 3–5 (2005)); Michael Hunter Schwartz, Teaching Law by Design: How
Learning Theory and Instructional Design Can Inform and Reform Law Teaching, 38 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 347, 366 (2001). See generally CATHY DOWN, LEARNING FOR TRANSFER: A
THEORY OF SITUATIONAL LEARNING (2001).
172. Grose, supra note 171, at 494.
173. See, e.g., Bryant, Milstein & Shalleck, supra note 140, at 23–24 (explaining the
power and importance of reflection in clinical pedagogy).
174. See, e.g., Kosuri, supra note 161 (“In my view, [the dialogue regarding the future
of clinical legal education] should be characterized by a more explicit ideological neutrality.”).
175. See, e.g., Jayashri Srikantiah & Jennifer Lee Koh, Teaching Individual Representation
Alongside Institutional Advocacy: Pedagogical Implications of a Combined Advocacy
Clinic, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 451, 452 (2010) (referring to “effecting social justice” as one
of clinical legal education’s “bedrock goals”); Wizner, supra note 143, at 327; Jane H.
Aiken, Provocateurs for Justice, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 287, 288 (2001); Anna E. Carpenter,
The Project Model of Clinical Education: Eight Principles to Maximize Student Learning
and Social Justice Impact, 20 CLINICAL L. REV. 39, 42 (2013) (“The development of
projects is also driven by social justice goals.”).
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juris doctorate curriculum,176 as practiced in most law schools, has been
criticized for advancing the fiction that law is an objective, value-neutral
set of rules that need only be applied correctly to produce an optimal result.177
“The pedagogical assumption within law schools is that our subject matter
is innately neutral.”178 Scholars have rightfully challenged this purported
neutrality and proposed clinical pedagogy as an antidote.179 Through clinical
pedagogy, students are reminded that the law is a sharp tool that can be
used either to aggrandize the powerful or to vindicate the powerless. By
seeing these injustices up close—in both personal and technical detail—
students can observe the ways in which the legal system was built to reinforce
the aggrandizement of the powerful. Additionally, a justice-focused
experiential learning program can also foster students’ development of
empathy, which is a core lawyering skill. By developing a professional
interpersonal relationship with a client who is facing particular structural
challenges, students can gain a more personal perspective on systemic
oppression, while also navigating professional boundaries and other related
skills.
Early clinical teachers focused also on teaching justice.180 “From the
beginning, clinical education has had a goal to teach students about how
the law affects poor people, the ways that law reinforces oppressive systems,
and the ways that it can be used to challenge them.”181 Indeed, the goal
of teaching students about justice has been infused into the development
of student practice since its earliest days in law school curricula.182
Ongoing, robust scholarly discussion on the importance of justice as an
experiential learning goal should put to rest any concern that justice is

176. “Even with all that has been added and altered (especially available to students
in the second and third year), today’s education still parallels too strongly Langdell’s 1870
model rather than a 21st Century model of what lawyers variously do and should know
how to do.” Gerald P. López, Transform—Don’t Just Tinker With—Legal Education, 23
CLINICAL L. REV. 471, 521 (2017).
177. See Fran Quigley, Seizing the Disorienting Moment: Adult Learning Theory and
the Teaching of Social Justice in Law School Clinics, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 37, 39 (1995);
Aiken, supra note 141, at 11.
178. Aiken, supra note 141, at 7.
179. See, e.g., id.
180. See Gary Bellow, On Teaching the Teachers: Some Preliminary Reflections on
Clinical Education as Methodology, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT: LEGAL
EDUCATION IN A SERVICE SETTING 374 (1973); Susan Bryant & Elliott Milstein, The Clinical
Seminar: Choosing the Content and Methods for Teaching in the Seminar, in S USAN
BRYANT, ELLIOTT S. MILSTEIN & ANN C. SHALLECK, TRANSFORMING THE EDUCATION OF
LAWYERS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CLINICAL PEDAGOGY 52 (2014).
181. Bryant, Milstein & Shalleck, supra note 180.
182. See Stephen Wizner, The Law School Clinic: Legal Education in the Interests
of Justice, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1929, 1933 (2002).
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falling out of favor as a goal of clinicians and externship directors. 183
Dean Jane Aiken has argued that teaching social justice through clinic is
an important part of all law schools’ educational missions.184 Principles
of social justice help students learn empathy, which is a skill necessary for
success as a lawyer.185 Dean Aiken encouraged clinicians to be provocateurs
for justice, a powerful turn of phrase which conveys that clinicians ought
to have not just a professional interest but a sort of existential urgency for
justice.186 Provocateurs for justice instill in their students a lifelong passion
for justice as well as both the desire to work towards solving injustice and
the tools to do so.187 There is no doubt that justice is a fundamental goal
of experiential education for Aiken and many other leaders in the field.188
5. Academic Rigor
While not separate from any one of the other goals articulated in this
subpart, academic rigor merits treatment as a discrete, if overlapping, goal
of experiential learning. As a vital part of the law school curriculum, clinic
and other experiential courses must be academically rigorous. Experiential

183. See, e.g., Lynnise E. Phillips Pantin, The Economic Justice Imperative for
Transactional Law Clinics, 62 VILL. L. REV. 175 (2017); Julie D. Lawton, Teaching Social
Justice in Law Schools: Whose Morality Is It?, 50 IND. L. REV. 813, 814 (2017) (arguing
that clinics should offer diverse approaches to what social justice means); Jane H. Aiken,
The Clinical Mission of Justice Readiness, 32 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 231, 231 (2012)
(arguing that law schools should use clinics to teach “justice readiness”); Alistair E. Newbern
& Emily F. Suski, Translating the Values of Clinical Pedagogy Across Generations, 20
CLINICAL L. REV. 181, 181 (2013) (discussing how different generations of clinical teachers talk
about justice differently); Spencer Rand, Social Justice as a Professional Duty: Effectively
Meeting Law Student Demand for Social Justice by Teaching Social Justice as a Professional
Competency, 87 U. CIN. L. REV. 77, 78 (2018) (arguing that law schools must teach social
justice as a core competency to serve students’ multifaceted needs); Douglas L. Colbert,
Clinical Professors’ Professional Responsibility: Preparing Law Students to Embrace Pro
Bono, 18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 309, 326 (2011) (arguing that clinicians must
instill in students a sense of responsibility to bridge the justice gap).
184. See Aiken, supra note 183 (arguing that law schools should use clinics to teach
“justice readiness”).
185. Quigley, supra note 177, at 38. For a discussion on the value of using community
legal education to teach social justice, see generally Margaret Martin Barry et al., Teaching
Social Justice Lawyering: Systematically Including Community Legal Education in Law
School Clinics, 18 CLINICAL L. REV. 401 (2011).
186. Aiken, supra note 175.
187. Id.
188. See, e.g., Bellow, supra note 180, at 376–77; Bryant, Milstein & Shalleck,
supra note 140, at 13, 16–17.
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learning compliments, reinforces, and expands upon the learning that takes
place in other courses. Academic rigor is a key question in the emerging
conversation about experiential education’s role in potential bar exam
alternatives.189 Although it is not clear what will result from those conversations,
they should spur efforts to ensure the academic strength of experiential
learning programs. Building rigorous experiential courses takes a significant
investment of time and expertise in defining goals, learning outcomes,
evaluation criteria, evaluation mechanisms, and teaching methods. 190
Effective design and implementation of experiential learning programs
require not only knowledge and skill in the field of experiential pedagogy,
but also a commitment to critical reflection and self-improvement on the
part of the teacher.191
6. Professional Competency Screening?
Whether experiential courses could or should replace the bar exam—
either temporarily or permanently—is an interesting open question. For
years, the bar exam has served as the definitive professional competency
screening tool for the legal profession in nearly every state.192 Although
the search for alternatives to the traditional bar exam did not begin with
the 2020 novel coronavirus pandemic,193 that search gained new salience
given the ongoing public health crisis posed by the virus. 194 In the spring

189. Patrick Thomas, Law Students in ‘No Man’s Land’ as Coronavirus Delays Bar
Exams, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 19, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/law-studentsin-no-mans-land-as-coronavirus-delays-bar-exams-11587294001 [https://perma.cc/49HPZAK2].
190. See generally Jordan, supra note 9 (outlining the challenges of building quality
experiential courses).
191. See JEAN KOH PETERS & MARK WEISBERG, A TEACHER’S REFLECTION BOOK:
EXERCISES, STORIES, INVITATIONS 26 (2011).
192. But see N.H. SUP. CT. R. 42(XII) (allowing graduates of the Daniel Webster
Scholar Honors Program to be eligible for admission to the New Hampshire bar upon
completion of the program without further examination); WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.03 (providing
requirements for diploma privilege).
193. See, e.g., Andrea A. Curcio, A Better Bar: Why and How the Existing Bar Exam
Should Change, 81 NEB. L. REV. 363, 365–66 (2002) (arguing the need to reform the bar
exam and proposing several potential alternatives); Kristin Booth Glen, Thinking Out of
the Bar Exam Box: A Proposal to “MacCrate” Entry to the Profession, 23 PACE L. REV.
343, 353 (2003) (proposing an “experience and performance-based bar examination”).
194. See, e.g., STANDING COMM. ON BAR ACTIVITIES & SERVS., AM. BAR ASS’N,
REPORT TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS 1–2 (2020) (proposing limited licensure by diploma
privilege for recent graduates unable to take the bar exam due to the pandemic); Claudia
Angelos et al., Licensing Lawyers in a Pandemic: Proving Competence, HARV. L. REV.
BLOG (Apr. 7, 2020) [hereinafter Angelos et al., Licensing Lawyers], https://blog.harvard
lawreview.org/licensing-lawyers-in-a-pandemic-proving-competence/ [https://perma.cc/
948Q-ZKL3]; Claudia Angelos et al., The Bar Exam and the COVID-19 Pandemic: The
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of 2020, when the vast implications of the pandemic started to become
clear, a group of scholars, including Professor Claudia Angelos, quickly
articulated the urgent need for bar examiners to take action to provide a
safe means of licensure to the class of 2020.195 Professor Angelos and her
co-authors proposed a series of potential alternatives to the bar exam,
including experiential learning courses.196 The group also posited that the
pandemic might spur the legal profession to completely reevaluate and
potentially abandon the traditional bar exam in the future, saying, “Crises
challenge assumptions and demand action . . . For the future, we might
find a range of ways to prove competence, rather than resting on the predictions
of a written exam.”197
What, if any, long-term effects the pandemic may have on legal licensure
procedures remains to be seen. The experiential education community
must consider and discuss the viability and wisdom of experiential courses
replacing the bar exam. In the meantime, Professor Angelos’s proposal
generates a new opportunity to take stock of experiential learning as a
whole, and to ask whether all forms of student practice are effectively
advancing the purpose and goals of experiential education.198 As Angelos’s
group notes, crises challenge assumptions and invite broad reimagining of
calcified paradigms.199 Indeed, it is my position that student practice rules
ought to be subject to such paradigm-challenging reimagination.
V. TOUCHSTONES FOR REFORM
Spurred on by the conversation about whether experiential education
has a role to play in basic competency screening, experiential educators
should embrace the opportunity to reevaluate some fundamental concerns
about the regulation of student practice. For the reasons discussed in Part
IV above, many state student practice rules are in need of reform, and
those reforms would benefit not only experiential educators, but anyone
who has an interest in protecting the public and preserving the integrity of
Need for Immediate Action, (Ohio State Pub. L., Working Paper No. 537, 2020) [hereinafter
Angelos et al., The Bar Exam].
195. Angelos et al., The Bar Exam, supra note 194.
196. Id.
197. Angelos et al., Licensing Lawyers, supra note 194.
198. As will be argued in Part IV.B, all student practice must have a service-learning
purpose in order to justify its existence; otherwise, it is simply a licensure loophole. See
infra Part IV.B. Therefore, all student practice should be a form of “experiential education.”
199. Angelos et al., Licensing Lawyers, supra note 194.
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the legal profession. The goals of student practice should serve to illuminate
the path forward towards an ideal student practice rule in each state. Part
IV defined those goals as service, skills acquisition, professional identity
formation, critical reflection, justice, and an overarching goal of academic
rigor.200 Student practice has always had a service-learning mission, and
it is critical that service and learning go hand in hand.
Because of the educational and the public interests at stake, it is essential
to properly regulate student practice. Law faculty, particularly clinicians,
will be pivotal players in any student practice rule reform effort. Clinicians,
in particular, are likely more invested in student practice rules than anyone
else in the profession. In many legal communities, law faculty are viewed
as experts, which affords a platform upon which to advance advocacy
efforts. At many institutions, law reform efforts are viewed as part of a faculty
member’s service obligations and therefore carry other professional rewards.
For these reasons, as well as a deeper obligation to shape student practice
and set our students up for success, clinicians ought to review their state’s
student practice rules and propose changes where those rules do not align
with the goals of clinical or experiential education.
The following concepts are touchstones for reformers, courts, and
administrators seeking to align their states’ student practice rules with the
goals discussed above. These touchstones must be considered relative to
one another. There are many ways to balance interests and achieve proper
regulation of student practice. For example, the indigency requirement
may be less important when student practice is limited to in-house clinics.
If one constraint is relaxed, it must be balanced with other constraints in
order to maintain a proper level of control and oversight of student practice.
Ultimately the following touchstones must be considered as a whole and
balanced with one another, rather than treated as separate provisions of a
rule.
A. Supervision
High-quality supervision is a necessary condition for the achievement
of each goal within the broad, service-learning mission of student practice.
A good supervisor has the ability to design and implement an experiential
learning program that effectively accesses the transformative potential of
student practice. As any experiential educator knows, good supervision
takes an immense investment of time and thought. Without good supervision,
academic rigor in student practice is unattainable. The stakes of student
practice are too high to allow supervision quality to be left up to chance,

200.
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as is the case when student practice takes place outside the purview of law
school programs.
Any rule reform must focus on ensuring high-quality supervision for
students engaged in the practice of law. This means ending student practice
that is unaffiliated with law school programming. Students should practice
law only in settings that prioritize student learning. One approach is to limit
student practice solely to clinical programs in which a faculty member directly
supervises student casework. Another option is to allow a collaboration
between non-faculty field supervisors who oversee students’ casework
and faculty program directors who provide training, oversight, and
assessment to ensure the quality of each experiential learning opportunity
and support student learning through reflection. Although the latter model
may present challenges,201 it is certainly superior to student practice that
occurs in the total absence of faculty supervision.
Other provisions that may help raise the quality of student supervision
include requiring a supervisor’s presence in court, limiting the number of
students that can be supervised by each attorney, and making supervisors
explicitly responsible for the students they supervise. These provisions
are particularly critical in states that continue to allow student practitioners to
be supervised by non-faculty attorneys—against the advice of this Article.
Supervisors should be required to be present while students are in court and
to review and approve documents that affect a client’s rights. Student practice
rules should also make clear that supervisors must approve of the delivery
of legal services, even outside the courtroom, and will be held responsible
for any ethical violation arising from a failure to train or supervise.
B. Scope
In order to ensure integrity in student practice and advance its pedagogical
purpose, student practice rules should accurately encompass the scope of
what certified student-attorneys actually do. To that end, clinicians advocating
for rule reform must consider and define the scope within which they want
students to practice. Perhaps the simplest approach is to make student practice
coterminous with attorney practice. For example, Kansas authorizes students
to “perform any function of an attorney” subject to supervision guidelines,202
Maryland allows students to “engage in the practice of law” subject to

201.
202.

See Jordan, supra note 9.
KAN. SUP. CT. R. 719(j).
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certain restrictions,203 and Minnesota allows “[a] law student practitioner . . .
[to] perform, under the supervision of a supervising lawyer, all functions
that a lawyer may perform in representing and appearing on behalf of a
client.”204 Although it is critical to impose appropriate boundaries and
limitations on student practice, those limitations are better made in provisions
about supervision and setting, rather than scope of practice.
C. Consent
If student practice aims to teach students about relational skills, justice,
critical reflection, and identity formation, then centering client autonomy
in the attorney-client relationship is essential. In addition to protecting
the public on its face by requiring student practitioners to obtain informed
consent, this requirement also helps instill good values in our students.
The importance of client autonomy can be reinforced through strong client
consent requirements in all student practice rules. By specifically requiring
written client consent, we communicate to students the importance of
client autonomy as a professional value.205 The client holds the power to
allow the student to practice in a given case, or not.206 This dynamic sets
up an inquiry into deeper issues of power and autonomy that are critical
in any productive clinic experience. Clients have the right to be well
informed of the fact that they are being represented by a student—this
should be built into a student practice rule in multiple ways. Many states
require not only that a client provide informed consent, but that such
consent is documented in writing,207 and even filed in court.208 Some may
fear that requiring written client consent for out-of-court practice would
create an impracticable administrative burden. However, obtaining client
consent for student practice would be no more burdensome than requiring
written retainers for all legal services, whether in or out of court.209 In
making reforms, each state must weigh the interest of efficiency against
the interests in favor of a written consent requirement, and balance the
importance of client consent with the other interests discussed in this Part.

203. MD. R. 19-220(b).
204. MINN. SUPERVISED PRAC. R. 3.
205. Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement,
32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501, 514 (1990).
206. Id. at 510–11.
207. E.g., D.C. CT. APP. R. 48(a)(1)(2014); GA. R. SUP. CT. 95(5).
208. E.g., ALA. R. LEGAL INTERNSHIP L. STUDENTS R. II; ILL. SUP. CT. R. 711(c); VA.
R. PROF’L CONDUCT 15(a)(i), (iii).
209. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
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D. Economics
In order to ensure academic rigor, preserve the integrity of the educational
experience offered by student practice, and protect the public from poorly
supervised student practice, financial pressures must be well-considered
and balanced with other parameters. Paid, private-sector student practice
experiences, particularly those that are completely unaffiliated with law
school programming, create conditions that invite and even incentivize
poor supervision. Therefore, whether through provisions aimed at supervision
—limiting student practice to clinic or externship programs—or economics,
or both, some level of regulation of economic incentives is essential to the
success of student practice as a whole. Furthermore, if student practice is
aimed at teaching students about justice and pushing them to examine
structural inequities in our legal system,210 it is critical that students have
the opportunity to grapple with the legal problems of the poor.211 Reformers
should carefully consider all economic questions, including requirements
of indigency, pro bono service, and unpaid work. These concerns should
be examined within the context of other assurances of quality supervision
to ensure that a final rule prioritizes high-quality services to clients and
pedagogical value to students.
VI. CONCLUSION
Student practice rules across the country are rife with provisions that
frustrate not only the pedagogical goals of student practice, but also the
justice interests of the legal profession. A number of states allow student
practice that is unaffiliated with law school programs; this unaffiliated practice
can occur in the private sector and prosecutor’s offices. Many states lack
key assurances for a minimum quality of student practice supervision,
such as requiring supervisors to be present with students in court. Some
of these problems trace back to the ABA model rule, which was incredibly
important when it first passed, but is now outdated. Where states have
deviated from the model rule, those deviations have often represented
even further deregulation of student practice. Thus, student practice rule
reform efforts are necessary in many states. Legal educators, including
experiential educators, are well-positioned to spearhead these reforms, but
210. Including the social/systemic relational skills discussed above in supra notes
174–88 and accompanying text.
211. See supra Part III.C.
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all members of the legal profession have a stake in functioning student
practice rules because poorly regulated student practice threatens both the
public interest and the integrity of the legal profession.
The goals of student practice, as discussed above, should be the driving
force in shaping rule reform efforts. Part V above outlines several touchstones
to guide those who seek to reform their states’ student practice rules. With
these touchstones in mind, reformers can further the goals of experiential
education and allow experiential teachers to marshal student practice rules
to support these goals, rather than undermine them. Particularly important
is ensuring adequate supervision and academic integrity by ending the
phenomenon of unaffiliated student practice—that is, students practicing
law in contexts completely outside of the law school curriculum. Improving
student practice rules will help ensure that student practice best serves
students, the public, and the quality of justice as we shape a new generation
of lawyers.
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